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The Young Parsons 
and the Mature Habermas 
JAMES J. CHRISS 
Throughout his career Parsons steadfastly clung to a multiperspectival ap-
proach that attempted to avoid the one-sided dogmatism of those systems of 
thought that happened to be in ascendancy during any particular disciplinary 
epoch. 58 During his Amherst days and beyond, Parsons was confronted with the 
ideas of unitary evolution, empiricism, positivism, organicism, and neoclassical 
economics, as well as the equally one-side reaction to the latter, namely unor-
thodox institutional economics. S9 
This approach to social explanation was certainly evident in Parsons's Amherst 
papers. In his "Theory of Human Behavior in its Individual and Social Aspects," 
Parsons stressed that prevailing mechanistic and behavioristic systems of thought 
may not be appropriate for ethics and human behavior in light of cumulated 
knowledge ("facts"). Parsons is careful not to let the idea of the importance of 
"habit forming influences" on individual behavior lead him to embrace uncritically 
the organicism that was still prevalent during his time. Later Parsons got into an 
expanded discussion of culture, and especially the importance of cultural diffu-
sion and convergence, to explain change and evolution of social systems (p. 15). 
Parsons's goal here is to emphasize that explanations of human society must 
move beyond unilinear models, whether based on individual habit (e.g., utilitari-
anism or behaviorism) at one extreme, or the power of institutions or culture 
over the individual (e.g., institutional economics) at the other. 
On page 23 Parsons stated that " ... there is no reason to make any radical 
distinction in kind between habits of thought and technological habits. We are 
one organism, not two, and viewed from one angle we are physical, from an-
other mental, from another moral." This is extremely important; Parsons was 
attempting to overcome the overly simplistic idea that there are two social 
realities, namely the individual and society (the now famous and still unresolved 
"micro-macro" debate). 
It is noteworthy also that the entire basis of Habermas's (1984, 1987) theory 
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of communicative action banks on the distinctions Parsons made some sixty 
years previously, namely Habermas's notion of the universal validity claims un-
derlying all speech (or speech acts). The three dimensions (or analytical worlds) 
corresponding to the three validity claims are the subjective world (the validity 
claim of subjective truthfulness), the objective world (the validity claim of propo-
sitional truth), and the social world (the validity claim of normative rightness). 
Of course, this makes sense only in postconventional (modern) societies, be-
cause prior to that time, persons often drew upon only one world in making 
claims (such as appealing to tradition, the divine right of kings, aesthetics, re-
ligion, or whatever). 
Habermas's penchant for grand, overarching theory was borrowed from Par-
sons, and Parsons himself had been earlier influenced by that unique German 
brand of theorizing tracing back through Hegel and Marx, Simmel, Weber and 
Mannheim.60 In effect, the same logic underlying Habermas's analytic of the 
three worlds and the three validity claims can be found in the pages of Parsons's 
Amherst papers. Wearne (1989, p. 31) suggests that, influenced by the holism 
of German Enlightenment thought, Parsons was led to conceive of the unity of 
social explanation as hinging on the merging of three basic modal aspects of the 
human organism-the physico-chemical, the psychological-mental, and the so-
cial-moral-aspects which had been driven apart or treated separately in utilitar-
ian, behavioristic, or even institutionalist systems of thought (see also Carnic 
1991). 
In these postmodern times, where many observers are theorizing the end of 
the subject, a loss of certitude in the veracity of our modern social institutions 
(e.g., law, the family, science, the media), and especially an end to the grand 
"metanarrative" of Enlightenment rationality (e.g., Lyotard 1984), Jurgen Habermas 
stands almost as a lone voice in defense of the type of modernist social theoriz-
ing that Parsons championed. Habermas (1987) states for example that "no theory 
of society can be taken seriously today if it does not at least situate itself with 
respect to Parsons" (p. 199). But also in good Parsonian fashion, Habermas has 
never been wholly enamored of Parsons's ideas (see, e.g., Chriss 1995). In other 
words, just as Parsons established in his Amherst papers and beyond, Habermas 
approaches prevailing systems of thought critically, with an eye toward improv-
ing upon those ideas (including Parsons's own) and incorporating what is useful 
from them into his own evolving theoretical schema.61 
These undergraduate Amherst papers attest to the vision and importance of 
Parsons's approach to social explanation. They also serve to mark a clear lineage 
or continuity between the early stages of German enlightenment theorizing-of 
which Parsons was an heir-and current efforts to fashion an improved theory 
of society, the latter represented especially by Habermas's theory of communi-
cative action. 
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